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"PROBABLE CAUSE" IN CONNECTION WITH APPLICA-
TIONS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS.
By BEN ELY, JR.
In the recent cases of State v. Hammer" and State z,. Richardson2 the
Supreme Court of Missouri held that a search warrant was properly
issued by a justice of the peace upon an application filed and sworn to
by the prosecuting attorney which stated positively and not upon in-
formation and belief that intoxicating liquor was being kept on premises
therein particularly described but which did not state any further evi-
dentiary facts. In so ruling the court followed its own previous de-
cisions' and certain cases in the courts of appeal. In the still more
' (Mo. Sup. Div. 2, 1927) 292 S. W. 60, 1. c. 61.
, (Mo. Sup. Div. 2, 1927) 292 S. W. 61, 1. c. 62.
'State v. Perry, 267 S. W. 828, 1. c. 831 (1924); State v. Cobb, 273 S. W. 736,
1. c. 738 (1925) ; State v. Cockrum, 278 S. W. 700, 1. c. 702 (1925) ; State v. Hall,
312 Mo. 425, 279 S. W. 106 (1925); State v. Halbrook, 311 Mo. 1. c. 677, 279
S. W. 395 (1925); State v. Gooch, 285 S. W. 474, 1. c. 477 (1926); State v.
Stevens, 292 S. W. 36 (1927); State v. Richardson, 292 S. W. 61 (1927). All
of these cases were in Division No. 2 of the Supreme Court of Missouri. The
Stevens case involved an application in the same form made by a deputy sheriff.
In this connection it is well to call attention to the language of the statute
governing the issuance of search warrants in liquor cases. It is Section 25 of
the Prohibition Act of April 3, 1923 (Laws of 1923, p. 244 et seq.) and is as
follows:
The attorney general of the state of Missouri, or the prosecuting attorney
of any county, or any prohibition enforcement officer, is hereby empowered
to file in the circuit court, criminal court, court of criminal correction, or
any other court having criminal jurisdiction in the county, or before the
judge thereof in vacation, or justice of the peace, an application for a search
warrant, which application shall be by petition setting forth substantially
the facts upon which the same is based, describing the place to be searched
and the thing or things to be seized as nearly as may be, which petition
shall be verified by the oath of the officer filing the same. If it shall appear
to the satisfaction of the court in which said petition is filed or the judge
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recent case of State v. Catalino' the court reiterated the same doctrine.
The rule thus stated has been, however, severely criticized, and a de-
termined effort is being made to induce the tribunal to overrule these
cases. 5 Owing to the tremendous importance of the question to law
enforcement in the state it is well to examine briefly the grounds on
thereof in vacation, or justice of the peace before whom said petition shall
be filed, either from the facts set forth in said petition or from evidence
heard thereon, that there is probable cause to believe that intoxicating
liquor is being unlawfully manufactured, sold, stored, or kept . . . with-
in said county . . . it shall be the duty of such court or such officer be-
fore which or whom said petition was filed, to issue or cause to be issued
a search warrant . .
The following form of application or petition for a search warrant originally
devised by Mr. Benton B. McGowen, then prosecuting attorney of Rails County,
Missouri, is now universally used throughout the state upon recommendation of
the attorney general. It is the form attacked in the cases cited and in them held
good and it is the form discussed herein.
State of Missouri Before John Smith, Justice of the
County of . Peace township.
William Jones, Prosecuting Attorney, within and for the said county of
. . in the state of Missouri, upon his oath respectfully states and
shows the court that in the hereinafter described buildings and structures
and at and upon the hereinafter described premises and place in the said
county and state viz.: no. 597 White street in the city of
county and state aforesaid being a small frame house on the east side of
said street near the intersection of Black street, intoxicatin, liquor is be-
ing unlawfully manufactured, sold, stored, and kept; that thereat and
therein also being used and kept a still, doubler, worm, worm tub, mash,
mash tubs, fermenting tubs, vessels, fixtures and equipmern, and parts there-
of, used and fit for use in the manufacture and production of intoxicating
liquor. Your petitioner therefore prays that a search warrant be issued
as by law provided and delivered to the sheriff of said county, authorizing
and commanding said officer, with the necessary assistance to enter said
building, structure, premises, and place by force if need be, either in day or
by night, and the same diligently to search for said intoxicating liquor, still,
etc., and to produce before this court any such articles therein found in
possession thereof, and to make return hereof as required by law.
The warrant issued after the filing of this petition after reciting the filing of
the petition goes on to state that
from the facts set forth in sAid verified petition and the showing thereby
and thereupon made it is found by me that there is probable cause etc.
The petition is verified by a positive oath in the following form:
"William Jones, Prosecuting Attorney, being duly sworn deposes and states
that the facts set forth in the above petition are true."
'(Mo. Sup. Div. 2, 1927) 295 S. W. 568.
'In the case of State v. Gooch, supra, note 3, the court complained that "prac-
tically every case that comes here of this character contains an exhaustive review
of the law relating to the issues above mentioned." The writer is informed by
the attorney general that there are now pending six cases in Division No. 2 of
the court in which the same point is being raised. It is reported that in these
cases a very determined effort is being made to have the former Missouri cases
cited, note 3, supra, overruled. It is said that an attempt will be made to have
the question passed upon by the court in banc.
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which the accepted rule of the court rests and the arguments adduced
against it.6
The courts of a number of jurisdictions have held, in accordance with
immemorial custom, that an application for a search warrant which
states in general terms the commission of an offense and the presence,
on particularly described premises, of contraband goods and which was
verified only upon information and belief, was, nevertheless, entirely
sufficient to authorize the issuance of the warrant.7  Following the de-
cision of a Federal District Court s in 1921 a few courts began to hold
that a verification upon information and belief was insufficient.9 This
position was adopted by Missouri.10 This state, however, together with
a majority of those accepting the federal rule in this particular held that
so long as the verification of the application was positive i. e., not on
information and belief, it was sufficient if the affidavit stated in general
terms that the contraband property (intoxicating liquor, narcotics, stolen
goods, etc.) was being secreted or kept on the described premises, with-
' It is not too much to say that a decision in these cases adverse to the state
would mean an absolute nullification of the state prohibition act. Absolutely no
attempt to enforce that act would thereafter be possible. To argue as to the
wisdom or unwisdom of the prohibition law is not within the scope of this paper,
We express no opinion thereon. But it is well to remember that this policy,
rightly or wrongly, has bEen written into the federal constitution by a two-
thirds vote in the houses of congress and the ratification of three-fourths of the
states. For the court by a constitutional decision to set aside a policy so de-
liberately adopted by the representatives of the people would be to say the least
highly unfortunate.
'Cochran v. State, 138 N. E. 54 (Oh. 1923); Porter v. State, 100 So. 377(Miss. 1924) ; State v. Mallett, 122 Ati. 570 (Me. 1924); State v. Breen, 122 Atl.
571 (Me. 1924); Loeb v. State, 98 So. 449 (Miss. 1924); Bufldn v. State, 98
So. 452 (Miss. 1924); Zimmerman v. Town of Bedford, 115 S. E. 362 (Va.
1923); Foley v. Utterback, 194 N. W. 721 (Ia. 1923). For an analysis of the
authorities see Cornelius, SEARCH AND SEIZURE (1926) p. 274 et seq. Without
intent to criticize unduly the very interesting and helpful work of Mr. Cornelius
it should be pointed out that he writes from the viewpoint of a defending
lawyer. On all questions he leans away from a broad interpretation of the law
and is far more tender of the rights of an accused person than of those of
society. This strong bias must be kept in mind constantly in dealing with his
work.
'United States v. Burnside, 278 Fed. 249 (D. C. Wis. 1921), see the follow-
ing earlier cases suggesting the same rule. Tippman v. People, 175 Ill. 101, 51
N. E. 872 (1898); State v. Boulter, 5 Wyo. 236, 39 Pac. 883 (1895), warrant
for arrest).
' Central Consumers Co. v. James, 278 Fed. 249 (D. C. Ky. 1922); United
States v. Ray, 275 Fed. 1004 (D. C. Md. 1922); State v. Bird, 205 Pac. 241(Mont. 1922) ; People v. Dineen, 192 N. Y. S. 905 (1922) ; Giles v. U. S., 284
Fed. 208 (C. C. A. Ist Ct. 1923); Cooley v. Commonwealth, 195 Ky. 706 (1923);
People v. Effelberg, 109 N. W. 727 (Mich. 1923); Magen v. State, 220 Pac. 666(Okl. 1924).
' State v. Lock, 259 S. W. 116 (Mo. Sup. Div. 2, 1924).
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out any statement as to the particular evidentiary facts tending to show
that this was true."1
The Federal Courts1 2 on the other hand, and those of a few of the
states"' have held that such an application is insufficient and that it is
necessary for the affiant to state particular facts which show or tend
strongly to show the illegal possession of the contraband property, e. g.
in a liquor case he must state either that he has himself purchased whis-
key on the premises or has been present and seen whiskey sold there.14
He may not make use of hearsay to support his application and in one
case it is even held that his statement that the liquor purchased was
whiskey was not sufficient, but that he must either show a chemical
analysis or else qualify himself as an expert.1 5  It has even been sug-
gested that an applicant may not get a search warrant by stating that
he has seen intoxicating liquor sold on given premises since the sense
of smell alone is insufficient to identify the liquor as being intoxicating.10
It is this extreme form of the federal rule which it is sought to have
adopted in Missouri.
When the fathers of our state government wrote into our first con-
stitution section XIII of article 13 (now section II of article 2) the
fourth amendment to the federal constitution had been in force over
thirty years.17 Identical or highly similar provisions had been adopted
after the ratification of the fourth amendment by most of the older
states."' It is a matter of common learning that the framers of the
' See Missouri cases cited, note 3, supra, and also People v. Knopha, 220 Mich.
540, 190 N. W. 731 (1923); State v. Czckay, 218 Mich. 660 (1923); Bowen 'v.
Comm., 199 Ky. 400, 251 S. W. 625 (1923) ; People v. Flaczinski, 223 Mich. 650,
194 N. W. 566 (1923); Caudill v. Commonwealth, 249 S. W. 1005 (Ky. 1923);
People v. Kennedy, 303 Ill. 423 (1921); Blackburn v. Com., 202 Ky. 751, 261
S. W. 277 (1924) ; State v. Quartier, 236 Pac. 746 (Ore. 1925) ; Com. v. Intoxi-
cating Liquors, 95 Mass. 52 (1866); State v. Smith, 235 Pac. 273 (Okl. Cr.
1925). In 33 C. M. 676 it is said:
Where an affidavit, upon which a warrant was issued, contains positive
averment of facts justifying the issuance of the warrant, its validity is not
affected by proof aliunde that the facts therein positively stated were in re-
ality stated on information and belief.
" Giles v. United States, note 9, supra.
'Cf. In re Liquors, 197 N. Y. S. 758 (1923).
1' Even this statement that he has seen liquors sold seems to be considered as
insufficient by Mr. Cornelius, Op. Cit. p. 285, and by some courts. See Central
Consumers Co. v. James, note 9, supra.
Central Consumers Co. v. James, supra, note 9.
Some unreported cases in Federal District Courts have gone this far but
the general rule even in the Federal Courts is contra. See cases collected, Cor-
nelius, Op. Cit., sec. 91.
"This amendment was ratified Dec. 15, 1791. See Beard, AmRmuCAN GOVERN-
MENT AND PoLITcs (2 Ed., 1917) p. 65.
' For the various state constitutional provisions with the date of their first
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constitution of 1821 copied these provisions almost verbatim and in-
tended in so doing to adopt the construction theretofore placed upon
them by the federal courts and those of the older commonwealths. It
is also generally known that in adopting the fourth amendment Con-
gress and the ratifying legislatures had in mind pre-existing rules of
the common law regulating search, seizure, and arrest as those rules
had been stated by Lord Camdon in the cases growing out of the
"Wilkes incident."'1
Now it is worthy of note that in the cases mentioned, 20 Lord Camdon,
while attacking the practice of issuing general warrants, expressly ap-
proved the existing practice of justices of the peace in issuing warrants
for the search for stolen goods.2 1 It is also to be noted that James Otis,
in his famous speech on the "general warrants," which has been called
the spark which kindled the flame of the American Revolution, admitted
the propriety and legality of warrants issued in the common law form
by justices of the peace in larceny cases.2 2
It is clear that the general practise in England for many years prior
to the Wilkes cases had been for these warrants to issue upon applica-
tions which stated only in general terms the commission of a larceny
and that the affiant believed and had good and probable cause to be-
lieve that the goods so stolen were concealed upon the premises de-
scribed.Y Hence it follows that both Lord Camdon and Otis believed
that such an affidavit, filed with a justice, gave him sufficient grounds
for finding that "probable cause" for the issuance of the warrant ex-
isted. It therefore is certain that the framers of the constitution did
not mean that the provisions of the fourth amendment should require
any other and greater amount of proof than this for the establishment
of probable cause. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that
applications in this form were universally held valid by American courts
under the very constitutional provisions here under discussion until the
enactment of the present prohibition laws in the last decade.24
In this connection it may be pointed out that the fourth amendment
and also section I1 of article 2 of our state constitution place the same
enactment see Fraenkel, CONCERNING SEARCHES AND SEIzuREs, (1921)34 Harvard
Law Rev. 361.
', See Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 392 (1914).
Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. State Trials 1029 (1765) ; Leach v. The Kings
Messengers, 19 How State Trials 1001 (1765); Wilks v. Wood, 19 How. State:
Trials -1153 (1763); W'lks v. Halifax, 19 How. State Trials 1805 (1765).2 See Entick v. Carrington, supra, note 20.
Hart, AMERICAN HISTORY AS TOLD BY CONTEMPORARY, Vol. II, p. 375 (1903).
'2 Hale, P. C., 249.
"See e. g. Humes v. Tabor, 1 R. I. 464 (1850).
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limitations upon warrants for arrest that they do upon warrants for
search. The language of the state constitution in this respect is of par-
ticular interest:
That the people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes
and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures and no warrant
to search any place or seize any person or thing, shall issue without
describing the place to be searched or the person or thing to be
seized, as nearly as may be; nor without probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation reduced to writing. (Italics ours.)
The words printed in italics clearly show the application of the section
to warrants for arrest. What other kind of warrant could issue to seize
a person? What is an unreasonable seizure of the person if it be not
an arrest? Here, too, we must look to history for an interpretation of
the constitutional language. The general warrants which were de-
nounced by Otis and Camdon and which constituted the evil which the
constitutional provisions sought to remedy were in many instances not
search warrants at all, but warrants for arrest. Some of the great cases
in which the legal principles of the amendment were first laid down
contained counts for false imprisonment as well as for trespass q. c. f.
and de bonis.28 In the light of history as well as of the words of the
constitution themselves the application of the section to warrants for ar-
rest is obvious. Yet it is a matter of general knowledge that warrants for
arrest have been issued from time immemorial on general allegations of
the commission of a crime contained in an affidavit which are substan-
tially the same as those used in an indictment or information.2  If our
zourts adopt the federal rule and if they are consistent they will require
every complaint filed with a justice for the issuance of a state warrant
to contain a full account of all the evidentiary facts just as they will
come from the lips of the witness on the trial. Then, too, if the court
should so hold and should be consistent it must declare unconstitutional
the sections of our statutes which permit the issuance of capias on the
mere filing of a verified information by the prosecuting attorney.27
, See cases cited supra note 19.
See Lustig v. People, 18 Colo. 217 (1893).
Section 3849 R. S. Mo. 1919, Section 3851 R. S. Mo. 1919, Section 3760, Sec-
tion 3761 R. S. Mo. 1919. The later sections apply to prosecutions before justices
of the peace. Where the prosecuting attorney files the information on his oath
of office no complaint of a private prosecutor need be filed to authorize a war-
rant to issue. The prosecuting attorney may file such an information verified
only on information and belief. State v. Ransberger, 106 Mo. 135 (1892). In
many cases it has been held that constitutional provisions worded exactly like those
in Missouri, here under consideration, apply equally to warrants for search and
warrants for arrest. See e. g. Lustig v. People, supra, note 26; Thornberry v.
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We turn now to the theoretical objections urged against the present
Missouri rule. For convenience we will state the argument more fully
than the objectors themselves customarily do, expressing premises which
they usually prefer to leave inarticulate. 28  The argument fairly states
it as follows: (1) The existence of probable cause must be determined
by the judicial officer who issues the warrant, for in so doing he is
performing a judicial function which could not be delegated to an execu-
tive officer such as the prosecuting attorney without violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. (2) The issuing
officer cannot determine the existence of probable cause from the affi-
davit of the prosecuting attorney, since he must make his determination
from "legal" evidence before him and that affidavit (a) is based on the
statements of others and hence is purely hearsay, and (b) states merely
a conclusion of the prosecutor and not ultimate facts.
The argument usually adduced in support of the first proposition,
namely that the function of determining probable cause is a judicial
one and hence must be performed by a judicial officer, is specious rather
than sound. The classification of political activities and their division
among the three great departments of government may not be ac-
complished by any process of a priore reasoning nor by the application of
metaphysical rules.29  Legislative, executive, and judicial power are
terms of an ever varying meaning which must be defined in each new
political situation in the light of historyo and of present practical neces-
sity."l Now, historically considered, we cannot say that the determina-
tion of probable cause is a judicial function. In England, from an
early date, executive officers issued warrants both for arrest and for
search of premises. And this power was expressly upheld by the
courts.3." Moreover our own court, in a well considered opinion, has
held that in so far as preliminary hearings in felony cases are concerned,
the determination of probable cause is not a judicial function.P2
It may be contended, however, that the constitution requires that
State, 3 Tex. App. 36 (1877) ; State v. Boulter, 5 Wyo. 236, 39 Pac. 883 (1895);
State v. Shafer, 26 Mont. 11, 66 Pac. 463 (1901).
' The proponents of the federal rule (by which we mean the inferior or
harsher federal rule announced in Giles v. United States, supra, note 19) usually
object to a warrant in the form here used on the ground that it is a conclusion
or a mere hearsay statement without fully stating the argument.
Garner, INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE, (1910) Chap. XIII, THE FD-
ERALIST No. 46; Duguit, DaoIT CONSTITUTIONNEL, p. 369; Woodrow Wilson, CON-
STITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, p. 56.
"James M. Landis, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE CONGRESSIONAL
POWER OF INVESTIGATION, (1926), 40 Harvard Law Review 153, 1. c. 156.
"United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1910).
"a Cases cited, supra, note 20.
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probable cause be "supported by oath or affirmation" and that this is
equivalent to requiring that it must be determined on the basis of a
sworn or affirmed statement. That, therefore, the person making the
oath or affirmation may not himself determine probable cause since he
cannot determine it on the basis of his own oath. The argument seems
somewhat strained and scholastic, 3 yet for the purposes of the present
discussion we may admit that it is sound, and that we should therefore
concede the first proposition on which the attack on the rule under con-
sideration rests.
In conceding, however, that it is the justice of the peace who must
determine the presence of probable cause and (ex hypothosi) that he so
determine from the affidavit of the prosecuting attorney, we have admit-
ted only one of the premises of the argument against the present rule.
It remains for the opponents of that rule to establish that the justice
may not lawfully determine probable cause from the evidence furnished
by that affidavit. In attempting so to do they insist that the justice must
make his determination on the basis of "legal" evidence and that the
affidavit of the prosecuting attorney is not legal evidence since it is (a)
a mere statement of a conclusion 4 and (b) hearsay. 35 Now ordinarily
legal evidence would mean evidence permitted by law"8 and to prove
that the affidavit of the prosecuting attorney was not legal evidence, they
would have to assert that it was not so permitted which is the very
proposition they started out to prove. Hence they fall, of necessity,
into a vicious circulus in probandum. It is evident, however, that they
do not mean to use the expression "legal" evidence in this sense, but
rather as denoting evidence which is permitted by those artificial legal
rules which grew up in the courts of common law in the regulation of
jury trials.S7 Such are the rules forbidding the reception of hearsay
and conclusions of witnesses. It is absurd to contend that the fathers
in adopting the fourth amendment meant to include therein by implica-
tion a requirement that in determining probable cause all of the then
existing rules of the common law system of evidence should be ob-
= State ex rel. v. Nast, 209 Mo. 708, 108 S. W. 563 (1908).
' It is to be remembered that the constitution does not require that the evi-
dence on which probable cause is found be sworn or affirmed evidence. It is
believed that the requirement of an oath springs from a very different reason.
This requirement is met by the oath of the prosecuting attorney no matter
whether in point of fact he or the justice determine probable cause.
,See e. g. State v. Lock, supra.
See the attacks made on the "Missouri rule" in the cases cited supra, note 3.
Note, LAW JOURNAL, May 22, 1926.
' Wigmore on Evidence, (2 Ed. 1922) Sections 4 and 4a.
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served.38  If such an implied addition is to be found in the fourth
amendment, why not similar ones in the fifth and the fourteenth ?31 If
they be present there, no legislative act would be valid which changed
the common law principles of evidence in the slightest degree; a propo-
sion whose absurdity is at once apparent.40  The sounder view is that
the constitution did not establish ariy rules of evidence by which
"probable cause" must be determined, and hence the rules in that re-
gard may be modified by the legislature in any manner it sees fit, pro-
vided its acts bear a reasonable relation to the ends sought to be at-
tained and are not wanton and arbitrary.
We are now prepared to consider the application to our present prob-
lem of the particular rules of evidence which are said to be violated by
the acceptance of the affidavit in question as the basis for a search
warrant. It is said that the affidavit is in reality a mere hearsay state-
ment on the part of the prosecuting attorney. In form, of course, it is
not hearsay,41 since the prosecutor does not state that he has been in-
formed of law violation on the premises, but states directly that intoxi-
cating liquor is being kept there.42 If, in reality he has no "direct per-
sonal knowledge" of this fact, the objection to his statement as evidence
lies in its violation of the requirement of "testimonial knowledge" and
not of the hearsay rule.' s But assuming that the hearsay rule were
really involved, it is clear that it can have no proper application here.
That rule exists for one purpose and one purpose only--to safeguard the
right of cross-examination. 4" In Europe, where the right of cross-
examination is of very recent recognition, the rule does not exist. In
our system of procedure, where the greatest emphasis is placed on cross-
examination as a substantial guarantee of the truth of testimony, we re-
ject a hearsay statement of an absent witness because the real witness-
the one who in reality saw the facts in controversy, and whose state-
ment about them is being retold by the witness on the stand, is not
subject to be cross-examined. But in a search warrant proceeding the
" If so it may well be asked what rules of evidence were incorporated into the
constitution? If it be the rules existing at the time this amendment was
adopted, it may be said that even in jury trials those rules have in the meantime
been completely changed.
"Particularly since the case of Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1924).
' If such rules of evidence are to be considered as being protected by the con-
stitution then statutes of which we have many, liberalizing the rules of evidence
in criminal cases would all be invalid, a conclusion, which on the face of it, is
preposterous.
"See the attack made on the Missouri rule in the cases cited note 3, supra.
" Wigmore, loc. cit., note 42. "Wigmore, Op. Cit., section 1361.
"Wigmore, Op. Cit., sec. 1362.
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defendant, is not, and in the nature of things cannot be, present either
in person or by counsel and hence no right of cross-examiation can ex-
ist. Therefore the hearsay rule, which exists only to safeguard cross-
examination, ought not to be applied-cessante ratione cessat ipsa lex.
It is also said that the procedure, here under consideration, does vio-
lence to the opinion rule-that the statement of the prosecuting at-
torney is a mere conclusion and hence is not "lawful" evidence. Now
if the word "conclusion" is used in the sense in which it is applied in
the law of pleading, it is obvious that the statement, here under con-
sideration, is not in any sense a conclusion. Every lawsuit, civil or
criminal,may be reduced as a logical argument to the form of a syllogism
in which the major premise is a statement of a general rule of law in
the form of a universal affirmative proposition, which predicates certain
legal consequences upon the existence of certain facts; the minor premise
is a statement of facts which asserts that the facts mentioned in the
legal major premise exists in the instant case; and the conclusion asserts
that therefore the legal consequences, embodied in the major premise,
follow in the instant case, e. g. in a prosecution for the possession of
liquor we may state the argument as follows: (1) all cases in which
the defendant has in his possession intoxicating liquor are violations of
the prohibition act and must be punished as such: (2) this is a case
in which the defendant has in his possession intoxicating liquor. (3)
Therefore this is a violation of the prohibition law. Now it is the state-
ment of this last proposition of the syllogism which is condemned in the
law of pleading as a conclusion. The pleader is required to state facts
and this means that he must state the second or minor premise of the
argument. Thus an information which states that the defendant has
and possesses intoxicating liquor, viz., whiskey, is universally held to be
good.45 It is therefore obvious that in the sense here referred to, the
statement of the prosecuting attorney is not a "mere conclusion."
There is another sense in which the term conclusion is sometimes used
and we believe it is in this sense that the proponents of the federal rule
employ it here. It is used as synonymous with the expression, "opinion
of a witness."'' 0a And opinions of witnesses are contrasted (not very
logically it is believed) with facts which the witness "knows." It is
necessary therefore to determine just what we mean by knowledge.40
"State v. Gooch, supra, note 3.
'a See Wigmore, Op. Cit., sections 1917 et seq. Even in this sense it is doubt-
ful if the statement, here considered, can really be said to be an "opinion" or
conclusion for the prosecuting attorney. Rather it is a simple statement of fact.
"In State v. Ransberger, 106 Mo. 135 (1891), (a case involving the kind of oath
required to verify an information) Thomas, J. speaking for Division 2 of our
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol13/iss2/1
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All the facts of external nature, which an individual may know at a
given time, may be classified into two groups: (a) there are those
physical phenomena which have given direct and immediate sensory
stimulation to his nervous system-things which he has seen, felt, heard,
tasted, or smelled. His conscious images of these things are percepts
and we may call his knowledge of them perceptional knowledge. (b)
there are many other things he knows by means of logical inferences
drawn from facts known perceptually. For example, the writer has
never seen Mr. Coolidge in the White House nor observed him while en-
gaged in the duties of his office. Yet he knows that Mr. Coolidge is
President of the United States. This fact he knows because he has in-
ferred it from any other facts sensually perceived, e. g., from state
ments in newspapers, books and magazines, from references in speeches
made by the President, etc.
47
Now it is sometimes said that a witness may not testify to inferences
he has drawn, but only to facts which he has himself sensually perceived.
It is these inferences of the witness which are called conclusions. And
the opinion rule is said to preclude his stating them. But this state-
ment is not universally true.4 Lay witnesses are often, and experts
Supreme Court discussed at length the meaning of the term knowledge. Dean
Wigmore, Op. Cit., Sec. 1919 clearly points out that there can be no scientific
distinction between "fact" and "opinion." This is not at all the basis of the so-
called "opinion" rule in our law of evidence. Clearly from the point of view of
epistomology no such supported distinction can be said to exist. All of our
knowledge is knowledge of mental states. We never directly know any "fact"
of the outer world. With this datum as a starting point some philosophers have
held that we can never really know the non-self. But even if we do not go
that far it is plain that there is no valid difference between knowledge of sen-
sually perceived fact and knowledge of conceptions inferred from such facts.
From the point of view of behavioristic psychology, on the other hand, the sup-
posed distinction is equally illusory. When witness A. tells on the stand that he
saw B. strike C., he is merely reacting to a certain sensory stimulus in a way de-
termined by certain connections in his nervous system. When he states that in
his opinion Blackacre is worth $90 per acre, he is doing exactly the same thing.
In the latter case the nerve centers involved are a little higher and the process
of reaction is more complex, that is all. Plainly then, no definite line between
"fact" and "opinion" can ever be drawn. The terms are real variables to which
the courts can and do apply, changing meanings in each case which arises. Per-
haps they thus serve a good purpose. Perhaps, as has been suggested by Dean
Wigmore, loc. cit., they have only brought confusion into the law of evidence.
' Modern science furnishes us with many examples which clearly prove that
we know many things which are impossible of direct sensory perception. No
one has ever seen the hydrogen atom. It is so small that even the most power-
ful microscope or ultramicroscope cannot enable us to observe it. Yet we
clearly and positively know that it is composed of an electron which revolves
about a proton. No one has visited the sun or directly seen the various ele-
ments of which its surface is composed. Yet we know just what those ele-
ments are. Other examples might be multiplied indefinitely.
" As a matter of fact in jury trials every day witnesses are permitted to testify
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almost always are permitted to state their conclusions. A comparison
of the procedure in French, German, or Italian courts or of that of our
own administrative bodies with that of a tribunal in which a jury is
habitually employed shows that the reason for the rule is the assumed
inability of untrained jurors to properly weigh and evaluate the opinions
of witnesses and to distinguish opinions from primary evidentiary facts.
It is also to be noted that exceptions" to the rule are recognized when-
ever there is a necessity from the circumstances of the case so to do and
whenever some special guarantee of the witness' trustworthiness exists °
So closely connected with the hearsay and opinion rules that it is
often confused with them is the rule that a witness must possess testi-
monial knowledge.51 Ordinarily, in the course of a jury trial, he is not
permitted to tell of matters unless he has gained his knowledge of them
through direct personal sensual observation. Even when stating a con-
clusion, under an exception to the opinion rule, he must base his con-
clusion either upon data gained through his own observation or on data
which have been furnished the tribunal in the testimony of witnesses
who are themselves observers of the facts concerning which they have
testified.5 2 Yet this rule like the others mentioned is by no means uni-
versal. In many instances witnesses are permitted to state conclusions
which rest upon primary evidential facts not in evidence.53 Here, too,
the exceptions rest on the ground of necessity or convenience, and of the
existence of a substantial guarantee of trustworthiness.
It is believed that an examination of the practical side of the ques-
tion now under discussion will demonstrate that in the case of the affi-
davit of the prosecuting attorney both the necessity and the guarantee of
trustworthiness, mentioned above, exist.5 It is therefore believed that
to facts which they have inferred from other sensually perceived facts even
without stating the data on which their inferences are based, e. g. when a wit-
ness states the speed of an automobile, when he says from the taste of liquor
that it is whiskey, etc., or when he gives an opinion as to value or sanity.
" Experts are generally allowed to state their conclusions. It is submitted
that this is because the jury are considered incapable of drawing the correct
scientific inferences from the facts and also because there is a substantial guaran-
tee of the trustworthiness of the testimony of the experts.
' Wigmore, Op. Cit., Sections 1923, 1924.
"Wigmore, Op. Cit., Sec. 650 et seq.
aChouteau v. Searcy, 8 Mo. 736 (1844); Cf. Bushel's case, 6 How. State
Trials 999, 1. c. 1003 (1670); Ann. Y. B. 23 Ass. Pl. 11, and Y. B. 20 H. VI 20;
for modem cases see Gunn v. State, 78 Fla, 599, 83 So. 511 (1919) ; Frederick
v. Brainard, 32 Idaho 296, 182 Pac. 351 (1919).
" See Wigmore loc. cit.
"If the various exceptions to the rule, listed by Wigmore, loc. cit., note 53,
are noted these two reasons will be seen to apply to all of them.
"As will be shown in the later portion of this paper the other evidence, which
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none of the three rules of evidence upon which the proponents of the
federal rule rely in their attack on the present Missouri rule has any
application to our problem. It is submitted that on purely technical
grounds the attack on the present rule fails, and that the whole question
becomes, as indeed most constitutional questions become in the long run,
one of reasonableness-whether or not the ends of legislative action
are proper and the means employed are fairly calculated to effectuate
those ends without unduly injuring other interests more socially im-
portant than those which are sought to be protected. 5
might be used as a basis for the issuance of a warrant, is unavailable and the
forces of public opinion exerted on the prosecutor form a sufficient guarantee
that his actions will be careful and reasonable.
"A learned friend has pointed out that this reasoning amounts to an asser-
tion of the old proposition that the end justifies the means. We might well
answer his objections by quoting the often repeated language of a great Missouri
philosopher "if the end doesn't justify the means it is hard to imagine what
can." As a matter of fact in law, and in particular in constitutional law, the
end and the end alone must justify each rule. With the exception of a few evo-
lutionary positivists, modem ethical thinkers are agreed that we cannot judge
any act to be right or wrong save as it tends towards or away from some ideal
end which we call the good. As to the nature of the greatest or highest good
they may dispute but as to the fact that it is the end of all action there is no
argument Friederich Paulsen, SYsTEm OF ETHICS, (1898) Bk. II, Chap 1. See
the following statement:
Indeed I do not see how teleological ethics can deny the proposition (that
the end justifies the means). But I see no reason why it should wish to
deny it. When rightly understood the proposition is harmless and neces-
sary. When misconstrued, of course, it becomes absurd and damnable.
Thilly's American Edition, p. 233.
The state, like all other social organizations and agencies, is merely a means
tcward an end. In a democracy we conceive of that end as the good of the
individual citizens-the members of society. We have learned from the
positivistic jurists that law is merely a generalized statement by which we at-
tempt to describe certain past phenomenon of behavior-the actions of judges
and other state officers under given circumstances and conditions and upon which
we attempt with some degree of probable success to forecast the future action
of the same or other state officials under similar circumstances. See Walter
Wheeler Cook, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASIS OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1923).
33 Yale Law Journal 45. SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND THE LAW, American Bar
Association Journal, July, 1927. But we know that law is constantly undergo-
ing an evolution. Existing rules of law differ materially from the rules of fifty
years ago. Now this legal evolution differs in one remarkable respect from
biological evolution. It is self-conscious and self-directed. Rules of law are
changed by the conscious volitional activity of men-judges, legislators and the
like. But if we consciously control the change and evolution of law-if we will
it to be what it is-we can classify existing rules as good or bad. And such ajudgment passed upon rules of law means that we evaluate them in accordance
with their tendency toward or away from an ideal social good. This is the
position which the sociological jurists of today avoidly assume. Rules of law
they tell us are merely means with which we seek the ends of social control.
The task of the lawyer is one of social engineering. He must weigh the con-
flicting interests in every legal situation and protect by legal rules those which
are most important. See Roscoe Pound, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY,
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Turning therefore from the technical and theoretical to the practical
and pragmatic aspects of the question, let us inquire what are the actual
results of the federal rule as it is applied in the courts of the national
government and what are the actual results of the Missouri rule as ap-
plied by our state officers. 7  In a former article in the ST. Louis LAW
REVIEW, 5 8 the writer has had occasion to point out the marked difference
which must be noted between the enforcement of social and economic
regulatory statutes such as the prohibition law, the narcotic law, laws
against gambling, pure food and drug laws, anti-trust laws, factory in-
spection laws, child labor laws, minimum wage laws and the like, on the
one hand, and the traditional type of criminal law, as e. g., the law of
murder, rape, larceny, robbery, arson, and the like on the other. In the
beginning of every system of jurisprudence the law of crimes and the
law of torts are scarcely distinguishable. 59 Crimes are injuries to the
individual members of the community and are punished by the direct
action of the wronged party in accordance with legal restrictions.6 0 In
(1922) Chap. II. Such a view of the state and of law are in line with the more
progressive trend in constitutional interpretation such as is to be seen in the
opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes.
" In discussing the practical working of the two rules we have relied upon
information furnished by federal and state prosecutors, sheriffs, police officers,
justices of the peace, judges, defending lawyers, and others who are in close
touch with the administration of criminal justice. A questionnaire, covering
certain aspects of the present problem together with others in the general field
of search and seizure, was sent to all of the prosecuting attorneys of Missouri.
Personal interviews were had with federal and state officers and court records
were examined. We have placed some reliance on the data gathered in.the
course of a similar study and published in an interesting and instructive "Com-
ment" in 36 Yale Law Journal 988 (1927).
Ely, FEDERAL CONsTITunoNAL LIMITATIONS ON SEARcu uY STATE AUTHORITY,
(1927) 12 St. Louis Law Review 159.
"In addition to these tort-crimes, which are the real basis of our modern law
of crimes, there were offenses against the tribal gods which form an excep-
tion to the general rule. These offenses were punished by the action of the tribe
as a whole or by the religious cast. But they are apart from the general evolu-
tion of the criminal law. There are also certain exceptions in regard to offenses
against the king as an individual, such as the game laws in early England. Then
there were certain social and economic laws which bear a slight resemblance to
our modern legislation in these fields, e. g., the laws governing monopolies in
food stuffs. Generally speaking these laws were made for the benefit of a cer-
tain small social class as the members of a trade guild or the like and these per-
sons became the prosecutors who could be relied upon to commence and push a
prosecution and thus make enforcement possible. None of these exceptions is,
however, of any great importance.
" The early law of the Hebrew people furnishes a good illustration of this
phenomenon. There are traces of the institution of blood vengeance even in
their earliest law code, the "Book of the Covenant.' See Ex. 21, 12-15 (homo-
cide), Ex. 21, 16 (larceny), Ex. 21, 28-29 (negligent keeping of a vicious beast).
In cases of assault this blood vengeance could be avoided by the payment of a
sum of money like the Wergild of our Anglo-Saxon ancestors. Ex. 21, 18-19.
Even the code of Deuteronomy, adapted as it was to a higher state of civiliza-
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our own law this system of private vengeance gradually gave way to one
of prosecution in the king's courts but even here the prosecution was
initiated by the act of the wronged individual and the case largely under
his control."' All of the traditional forms of our criminal procedure
were developed under such a system and presuppose the existence of a
"prosecuting witness" or "prosecutor," who is the person wronged by
the defendant's criminal act and who will report the matter to the officers
of the law, set in motion the state's machinery, 8' 2 and furnish evidence
on which the defendant may be convicted. Out of this situation has
come our conception of criminal procedure as a duel between the prose-
cution (in interest usually identified with some particular prosecuting
witness and represented by the prosecuting attorney) and the defendant
in which the court acts as a sort of impartial referee who blows the
opening whistle, sees that the game is played according to the rules, and
penalizes either party who violates them.63
Unfortunate as this sporting attitude in regard to criminal juris-
prudence is in any case, it had considerable justification in the case of
tion, did not do away with the private blood vengeance (legal self-help) but only
limited it by such institutions as that of the cities of refuge. Deut. 19, 1-14.
In our own jurisprudence the law of crimes began as a limitation of the right
or practise of blood vengeance. Out of this after the Norman conquest came
the trial by battle-later the trial by a petit jury, after an indictment returned
by a grand inquest. But even here as has been said the burden of commencing
and carrying on the prosecution was on the injured party. See James B. Thayer,
THE OLDER MODES OF TRIAL, (1891) 5 Har. Law. Rev. 45.
" He (the private prosecutor) can and does manage the whole matter as he
might manage any other action at law; he employs a solicitor, who may or
may not instruct counsel, and who takes proofs of witness, brings them be-
fore the committing magistrate, and the grand jury, instructs counsel at the
trial, and, in a word, manages the whole of the proceedings just as he would
in a civil cause. . . . Every private person has exactly the same right
to institute any criminal prosecution as the Attorney General or anyone else.
Sir James F. Stephen, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW, (1883) Vol. I, p. 493.
"Even our Missouri criminal procedure is based on this idea very largely. See
the following statutes. Section 3812 provides for the commencement of felony
prosecutions (other than by indictment) by the filing of a "complaint" before ajustice or other committing magistrate. From the language of the section this is
supposed to be filed by a witness-i. e., a private party who has been injured.
As a matter of fact it is now pretty generally filed by the prosecuting attorney
or by the police. This change has come as a matter of practice without statu-
tory sanction. Section 3818 provides for a preliminary hearing (under section
3848 this is necessary in every felony case before information can be filed) and
further provides that the "complainant" shall be examined by the magistrate.
Sections 4174 and 4175 make this complainant liable for costs where the de-
fendant is not bound over or where no information is filed against him. Sec-
tion 4173, however, exempts a public officer who has filed a complaint from this
liability.
"See a very interesting article in which this conception of criminal procedure
is discussed. Rollin M. Perkin, THE GREAT AMERICAN GAME, (1927) Harper's
Magazine, Nov., 1927, p. 750.
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the older criminal law. 4  But we have today to deal with an entirely
different type of criminal statute. In the society which has arisen since
the industrial revolution, with its minute division of labor, its intricate
interdependence of each individual upon every other individual
in the community, 5 its urbanization of population, 6 and its utiliza-
tion through scientific research of physical forces of unheard of
strength and potency, 67 social and economic relationships which were
formerly comparatively simple have become tremendously delicate and
complex. It is obvious that if civilization is to continue to exist at
all these relationships must be regulated by the power of the state, e. .,
in a simple rural society where the milk supply of the family comes
from their own cow or one of their near neighbors, no sanitary regula-
tions in regard to the methods of milking etc., are needed.08 But where
"In general our legal procedure in both civil and criminal trials is contro-
versial in its nature. Where the offense is in reality one against a private person
such a system works fairly well and appeals to the national psychology. Yet
even here it has been carried so far as to make some of our criminal trials
farsical. In truth even the old traditional crimes are being committed in new
ways. Modem scientific devices used by criminals make it impossible for the
wronged party to himself gain evidence sufficient to convict anyone. The crimi-
nal who today uses high-powered automobiles, high explosives, firearms of the
latest type, acetaline torches for opening safes, disease germs instead of poison,
and the like, must be caught by specially trained police officers who themselves
made use of the latest scientific discoveries. In other words the detection of
crime has become a specialized business for experts as indeed almost every
line of work has become in these days of division of labor.
"For the economic effect of the industrial revolution generally see Schapiro,
MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN HISTORY, (1918) Chap.3; Hays,POLITICAL
AND SocIAL HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE, (1917) p. 75 et seq.; Mantoux, LA REVO-
LUTION INDUSTRmILE AU SIECLE XVII, 1906). For the causes and effects of the
division of labor see Veblen, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (1904), p.
4 et seq.
"The extent of this urbanization in the United States is shown by the follow-





These figures are taken from Mr. Mark Sullivan's, HISTORY OF OUR TIMES
(1927), Vol. II, p. 198.
' The effect of these scientific discoveries on crime is pointed out by Judge
White in his paper on the "crime wave" read before the October, 1927, meeting
of the Missouri Bar Association. See John Turner White, THE CAUSE OF THE
CRIME WAVE, (1927) 13 American Bar Association Journal 726.
"In a simple community, like the one supposed, the individual purchaser will
generally know all about the sanitary conditions existing at the "plant" of the
seller. Competition will exist and he can demand of the seller satisfactory sani-
tary conditions, threatening, if they are not maintained he will go to another
seller. But in a complex society, the buyer cannot have any personal knowl-
edge at all of the conditions in the seller's plant. Furthermore a monopoly will
probably exist which would prevent the buyer from exerting any effectual eco-
nomic pressure on the seller.
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a single great pasteurization plant takes the milk of a hundred producers
and sells it to the thousands of families clustered together in a great
city, a minute state regulation of the whole process of production and
distribution becomes a pressing necessity. It is out of these conditions
of modern industrial and urban society that the new type of criminal
law has evolved and the evolution is a necessary one.
Now it must be noted that a violation of this new type of law differs
from the older kind of crime in that it is an injury to society as a whole
but is generally unattended with any particular injury to a definite per-
son.69 In other words there is no longer any "prosecuting witness" or
prosecutor to commence the action of the state, to furnish evidence, and
to see that the law is enforced. The prohibition law, which is at present
the most important of such social and economic regulatory legislation,
furnishes the best example of this fact. When Smith sells Jones a
drink of whiskey, the law has been violated. The violation of the law in-
volves social and economic consequences of the greatest practical conse-
quence, yet no one definite individual has been injured. The only per-
sons who have, ordinarily, any knowledge of the transaction are Smith
and Jones themselves. Yet, clearly, neither of them can be expected to
start a prosecution themselves or to give information to the state officers
which will lead them to start a prosecution. As a matter of fact even
were Jones brought before a grand jury and asked about the transaction
he would commit perjury rather than testify against Smith whom he
considers in the light of a friend and benefactor. It is obvious that the
state officers themselves, through their own unaided efforts, must find
out who is violating the law and must unearth sufficient evidence to se-
cure convictions. Thus it is seen that the old conception of criminal
procedure as a duel between the state and the defendant breaks down
and a new conception of that procedure as an impartial investigation on
the part of the state to determine the true facts of the case and apply
proper remedial action thereto takes its place.7 0
These conditions effecting the new criminal law have certain im-
portant consequences in connection with the use of search warrants. In
the first place, the use of search and seizure by government officers as
an instrumentality for the enforcement of all social and economic legis-
' Sometimes there is a person who is injured particularly by the violation of
the statute, but he is not in an economic position to complain, e. g., where a
minimum wage act prescribes a given scale of wages and an employer and em-
ployee contract for a lower scale. Economic pressure which is stronger than
the law of the state prohibits the wage earner from complaining.
" See the address of the writer before the Missouri Bar Association, report of
the 1924 meeting, p. 200.
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lation is absolutely necessary. Since, as we have seen, the sole initiative
in the inception of prosecutions must be that of the state officers un-
aided by private citizens, they must employ some means of gaining evi-
dence upon which they can proceed. There are only two ways of get-
ting this evidence open to them (a) the use of paid informers or "under-
cover" agents and (b) the search of private premises to gain tangible,
material evidence of law violations. Even when under-cover agents
are used searches are generally necessary to secure evidence corrobora-
tive of the testimony of these persons. The conclusions of the writer,
based upon his own experience as a prosecutor, are in this respect borne
out by the statements of a large number of state and federal prosecuting
officers interviewed concerning this question.71 In the opinion of them
all it is absolutely impossible to make any attempt at all to enforce either
a prohibition law, an anti-narcotic law, or any other similar statute, un-
less great freedom of search and seizure is allowed.
In the second place it is clear that the testimony of private individuals
cannot ordinarily be secured as a basis for the issuance of a search war-
rant.7 2 The same considerations discussed above are here applicable.
The only persons who have any knowledge which would enable them to
be witnesses are those who are either themselves involved in the crime
or consider themselves benefited by its commission. Hence they will
not only fail to offer themselves as witnesses, but in those rare instances
in which their names can be learned by the prosecuting officer, and they
are subpoenaed, they will commit perjury rather than offer evidence for
the state. Even persons not directly concerned will universally refuse
to give information to the officers of the state unless they are first as-
sured that they will not be required to appear in court and that their
names will not be disclosed. It is useless to discuss the ethics of the
situation-we are here dealing with a fundamental trait of race psy-
chology. We are merely stating a fact for the truth of which every
prosecuting attorney, sheriff, and police officer in the state can vouch.
In addition it must be remembered that if "raids" are to be successful
they must be made with the greatest of secrecy and dispatch. To sum-
mon into the justice court, in the search warrant proceeding, a number
"Out of between two and three hundred liquor cases in Marion County, only
some five or six were made on the testimony of private individuals, and out of
these only one resulted in a substantial conviction. Similar conditions exist in
many other counties according to reports from their prosecuting attorneys.
" The testimony of Missouri prosecuting attorneys on this matter is borne out
by the experience in New York, see Comment, 36 YALE LAW JOURNAL 988 cited
supra, and in Michigan, Waite- THE CONTROL OF CRamE, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
February, 1926, p. 214.
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of witnesses, many of them hostile, would be to foredoom the whole
attempt to failure.
Now it is obvious, as indeed the proponents of the federal rule them-
selves assert, that the state officers cannot themselves have direct and
personal knowledge of the sale of liquor or other similar law violations.
What is the result? If so-called "actual personal knowledge" be re-
quired as the basis for the issuance of a search warrant, since the
ordinary officers cannot in the nature of things have such knowledge and
the knowledge which private individuals do have is unavailable, we must
make use of persons who, while officers, yet work secretly and by under-
cover methods to discover the identity of law violators. This conclu-
sion reached by logical inference from the nature of the situation is
borne out by observation of the facts. The federal government, which
of course operates under the federal rule, never uses a search warrant
in a liquor or narcotic case unless it is obtained by an undercover agent
who has first made a "buy" from the prospective defendant.7"1 The
adoption of the federal rule by the state would therefore mean either
(a) that the use of search warrants in liquor, gambling, narcotic, pure
food and similar cases must be discontinued with a consequent complete
cessation of all attempt to enforce these laws; or (b) the creation of a
secret police. To the writer the latter contingency seems both imprac-
tical and socially undesirable.
Such is the practical working of the federal rule. How is the Mis-
souri rule working? Here again we base our conclusions upon inter-
views with a large number of prosecutors and peace officers. We take
as an example the enforcement of the state prohibition act, considering
it as typical of all similar social and economic legislation. Every day
many reports of violations of the act in the county are brought to the
prosecuting attorney, the sheriff, and the police. The latter refer these
reports to the prosecutor. Sometimes the complainants remain anony-
mous. To such reports little credence is given. In most instances they
consent to make known their identity in return for a promise from the
prosecutor that their names will not be disclosed in court. Rarely, if
ever, is a warrant issued on a single complaint. -But the prosecutor
takes the total of complaints made against each individual and weighing
all the evidence carefully finally determines when it amounts to a proof
of probable guilt. When he is satisfied that the prospective defendant
is probably violating the law he issues the warrant.7 4
"The writer is informed by federal prohibition officials that no warrants are
ever issued in liquor cases until "undercover" men have first visited the place
and either made a buy or seen liquor served in their presence.
"The process to which this evidence is subjected is much like that which the
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Now the opponents of the present Missouri rule will immediately say
that this is lodging too great a power in the hands of the prosecutor.
In answer we may point out that by a law whose wisdom no one dis-
putes the prosecuting attorney has the power to charge any citizen by an
information with the commission of any offense from murder or trea-
son down to the most petty misdemeanor."' If he can be trusted with the
power to place a citizen in jail, awaiting trial, cannot he be trusted with
the power to order the citizen's home or place of business searched, an
act which can at most occasion the person involved a merely temporary
inconvenience,76 but the real safeguard against abuse of this power lies
in the fact that the prosecuting attorney is an elected official.
He realizes that if he exercises his power in a rash, imprudent, or
tyrannical manner his hopes of re-election vanish. Furthermore, peace
officers hesitate to serve warrants unless they have at least a fair chance
of success, since too frequent failures lead to public suspicion that some-
one has "tipped off" the raids. Thus public opinion acting on the
prosecutor directly and through the medium of the peace officers with
historian uses in dealing with his "sources." All evidence, rumors, hearsay, re-
ports of police officers, the general past reputation of the owner of a place and
of the place itself, the character of the persons who frequent it are all con-
sidered and when on the basis of all of this testimony it seems probable that
liquor is being kept on the premises an application is filed and the warrant is-
sued. Most of the individual items of this evidence violate the rules established
for jury trials. But the prosecutor, like the historian in his field, is able to
take a mass of such evidence and sifting it thoroughly and letting one fact help
out another and one witness offset what others have said to arrive at a working
approximation of the facts.
" This analogy was stressed by Higbee, C. in his very able opinion in State
v. Halbrook, supra, note 3, some paragraphs of which deserve quotation:
Under the constitution and the statute, the prosecuting attorney without
having personal knowledge of the facts, may, by information, initiate
criminal proceeding against any person, even for a nonbailable offense, sub-
ject to the right of the accused to a preliminary examination. . .
If the unsupported information of the prosecuting attorney is deemed
probable cause for the arrest and incarceration of persons accused by him
of a felony, it seems unreasonable that, if this public official, charged with
the enforcement of the law for the protection of society, should, while act-
ing under his official oath and in the exercise of his discretion, file evi-
dence of unlawful manufacture, possession or transportation of intoxicating
liquors, that process should be refused unless and until he should produce
further proofs in support of such petition.
In answer to this it is said that no constitutional provision limits the issuance
for arrest while there is such a provision in the case of search warrants. But
this is not true. See the cases cited note 27, supra, and the text in connection
therewith. It is also said that the accused in a felony case has the right to a
preliminary examination. But even if he is given one and discharged by thejustice, the prosecutor may still file his information whereupon a bench warrant
must issue for the arrest and imprisonment of the offender. See section 3848,
R. S. Mo. 1919.
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whom he has to work, forces him to employ the greatest caution in the
issuance of applications for warrants.
After all, the final responsibility, in point of fact, for the issuance of
warrants must be placed on some one. It may be placed on the jus-
tice of the peace or it may be placed on the prosecutor. Or, as in our
system, it may rest in a certain degree on both of them but chiefly on the
prosecutor. Generally speaking the justices are men untrained in the
law and often with but slight general education. In most instances the
prosecutors are men of considerable legal education and experience. 77
The prosecutor is generally far more open to the influence of the right
kind of public opinion than the justice. Certainly it is as safe to lodge
these powers in the hands of the former, as in the latter. At best this
is a question of policy for the legislature. The discretion of that body
ought not to be hampered by the adoption by the courts of a narrow rule
of constitutional interpretation.
The present Missouri rule has, in the opinion of a vast majority of
the prosecutors of the state, done much toward bringing about con-
sistence and stability in our criminal procedure.7 8  The adoption of the
federal rule would not only create the utmost confusion, but would
make it practically impossible to enforce the prohibition law, laws against
gambling, pure food laws and other similar statutes. It is therefore
submitted that both on technical and pragmatic grounds the present rule
is the correct one and that it ought not to be disturbed by the courts.
Hannibal, Missouri.
"If the searching officers needlessly injure or destroy the defendant's property
he will have his action against them even though their wararnts were legal.
' Sometimes this is not true, of course. Missouri Crime Survey, (1926) p. 131,
et seq. But the remedy for this is not to curtail the powers of the office, but
to raise the requirements for election thereto and perhaps the compensation of
the incumbents. See Missouri Crime Survey, loc. cit., 78. 75 per cent. of the
prosecutors who answered the questionnaire stated that the number of motions
to suppress evidence had been greatly diminished since the law was settled on
this point. Of the search and seizure which reach the Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeal an increasingly large portion are being affirmed each year.
" The writer desires to take this opportunity of thanking Mr. Walter G. Still-
well, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County, and one of the editors
of this Review for his able assistance in the preparation of the questionnaire re-
ferred to and for other help rendered in the preparation of this article. Thanks
are also due to the prosecutors and others who have furnished information used
herein.
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